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Mesler v. Bragg Management Co.:
A Dramatic Change in the Application
of the Alter Ego Doctrine
In Mesler v. Bragg Management Company,' the California Supreme
Court held the release of a parent-owned subsidiary corporation did
not release the parent corporation in an action to pierce the corporate
veil through the alter ego doctrine.' Mesler significantly altered the
3
long standing common entity theory of the alter ego doctrine, in which
subsidiary and alter ego parent corporations were considered one entity in actions to pierce the corporate veil of the alter ego parent.
The court in Mesler held an alter ego parent and subsidiary corporation were one entity for the purpose of allowing a plaintiff access
to the assets of a parent corporation, but at the same time, the subsidiary and alter ego parent were separate entities for purposes of
joint liability.' As a result of Mesler, the separate entity of a corporation may be pierced for one purpose, yet remain separate and
distinct for another. The Mesler court treated an alter ego parent
and subsidiary corporation as joint tortfeasors,7 and applied California Code of Civil Procedure section 877, under which a release of
8
one joint tortfeasor will not release other joint tortfeasors. Therefore,
9
the release of the subsidiary did not release the parent.
Part I of this note summarizes the facts of Mesler and reviews the
opinion of the court.' Part II discusses the legal background of the
alter ego doctrine of piercing the corporate veil." Finally, part III2
of this note will discuss the legal ramifications of the Mesler opinion.'
1. Mesler v. Bragg Management Co., 39 Cal. 3d 290, 702 P.2d 601, 216 Cal. Rptr. 443

(1985).
2. Id. at 305-06, 702 P.2d at 610, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 452.
3. See infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
5. Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 300-01, 702 P.2d at 606-07, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 448-49.

6.

Id. at 300-01, 702 P.2d at 606-07, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 448-49; see infra notes 60-67

and accompanying text.
7. Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 303-06, 702 P.2d at 609-10, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 451-52.
8. CAL. Cwv. PROC. CODE § 877; see infra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
9. Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 303-06, 702 P.2d at 608-10, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 450-52.
10. See infra notes 13-97 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 98-130 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 131-38 and accompanying text.
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I.
A.

THE CASE

The Facts
The plaintiff, Wesley Mesler, was an employee of Crescent Coke

Handlers, Inc. 3 In 1979, plaintiff was operating a tractor previously
owned by Bragg Crane Services, Inc.,' 4 when he noticed a problem

with the blade of the tractor. During inspection of the tractor, plaintiff slipped into the engine fan and lost one third of his arm. 5 The

plaintiff named Crescent Coke Handlers, Inc., Bragg Crane Services,
Inc., and several others as defendants in his suit to recover for personal injuries.' 6 After two years of discovery, plaintiff learned that
Crescent Coke Handlers, Inc. and Bragg Crane Services, Inc. were
wholly owned subsidiaries of Bragg Management Company.'

Upon

this discovery, plaintiff amended his complaint to include Bragg
Management as a named defendant.' 8
In a motion for summary judgment, Bragg Management claimed
to have no connection with the workplace, the tractor, or the plaintiff.' 9 The plaintiff, having failed to assert the alter ego doctrine in

the pleadings,20 subsequently sought leave of the court to amend his
pleadings to include the alter ego theory of recovery against Bragg

Management. 2 ' Plaintiff's request was denied and the motion for summary judgment by Bragg management was granted.2 2 Plaintiff ap-

pealed the judgment. Prior to the hearing, Bragg Crane Services, Inc.,
a subsidiary of Bragg Management, settled with plaintiff in return
for an agreement by plaintiff to release Bragg Crane Services from
all liability.23
13. Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 295, 702 P.2d at 602-03, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 444-45.
14. Id. at 295, 702 P.2d at 603, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 445.
15. Id. at 295, 702 P.2d at 602, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 444.
16. Id. at 295, 702 P.2d at 602-03, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 444-45. Named parties included:
Crescent Coke Handlers, Inc., the plaintiff's employer; Mobil Oil Corporation, the owners
of the premises on which the accident occurred; Great Lakes Carbon Corporation, owners of
the coke pile plaintiff was working on at the time of the accident; Caterpillar Tractor Company, the manufacturer of the tractor; and uinamed Does. Id.
17. Id. at 295-96, 702 P.2d at 603, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 445.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Plaintiff had completed a great deal of discovery on the alter ego issue, but his pleadings
did not contain any alter ego claim against Bragg Management. The only feasable way plaintiff
could seek damages against Bragg Management would be to claim that Bragg Management
and its subsidiary, Bragg Crane Services, Inc., were alter egos. Id.
21. Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 296, 702 P.2d at 603, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 445.
22. Id. at 296, 702 P.2d at 603-04, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 445-46.
23. The plaintiff dismissed the claim against Bragg Crane Services, Inc. with prejudice
as part of the settlement agreement. Id.
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B.

The Opinion

The California Supreme Court first determined that because California has a liberal policy toward amendment of pleadings, the plaintiff
should have been allowed to amend his complaint to include the alter
ego claim against Bragg Management. 2 ' The court held that allowing
the amendment to include the alter ego theory would not constitute

undue surprise to the defendant since an extensive amount of discovery
already had been conducted on the subject of alter ego piercing.

5

The court next considered whether the plaintiff's release of the subsidiary corporation, Bragg Crane, acted as a release of the parent

corporation, Bragg Management. 26
The court examined the history and policies underlying section 877
of the California Code of Civil Procedure. 27 At common law, if an
injured party settled with one or more joint tortfeasors, the injured
party was precluded from recovering from other joint tortfeasors. 2s

The rationale behind this theory of limited recovery was that a plaintiff was entitled to recover only once for his injuries, and therefore,
settlement with one joint tortfeasor would constitute full recovery. 29

The inequity of this rule is apparent in the situation of an injured
plaintiff who settles with one of several joint tortfeasors for an amount
below the value of the claim and is barred from further compensation. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff could not be made
whole.3 0
In order to circumvent the common law release rule, the covenant
not to sue was developed. 3' The covenant not to sue allowed a plaintiff to receive money from a defendant in return for a promise not
24. Id. at 296-97, 702 P.2d at 603-04, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 445-46. A court may grant leave
to amend in the "furtherance of justice." CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 473. A conflict arising
out of a request for leave to amend is most often resolved in favor of the amending party.

5 WrrKIN,

CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE,

Pleading, § 1042 at 457-59 (3d ed. 1985).

25. Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 296-97, 702 P.2d at 603-04, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 445-46; see also
infra notes 98-130 and accompanying text.
26. Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 296-97, 702 P.2d at 603-04, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 445-46.
27. Id. Section 877 allows a plaintiff to settle with one or more of several joint tortfeasors
without impairing any future claim against nonsettling tortfeasors. Id.
28. Id. (citing Lamoreux v. San Diego Rye Co., 48 Cal. 2d 617, 624, 311 P.2d 1, 5 (1957)
and Chetwood v. California National Bank, 113 Cal. 414, 426, 45 P. 704, 707 (1896)); see
also Thaxter, Joint Tortfeasors: Legislative Changes in the Rules Regarding Releases and Contribution, 9 HASTINos L.J. 180, 182 (1958) (discusses possible legal ramifications of the 1957
legislative package including § 877).
29. Mesler, 31 Cal. 3d at 297-98, 702 P.2d at 604-05, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 446-47.
30. Id. at 297-98, 702 P.2d at 604-05, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 446. At common law, courts
would consider any type of satisfaction as the equivalent of a release. Id. See also Prosser,
Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 413, 423 (1937).
31. Mesler, 31 Cal. 3d at 298, 702 P.2d at 605, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
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to bring legal action against the defendant. Since the covenant not
to sue was a contract rather than a release, the common law release
rule did not prevent a plaintiff from bringing subsequent actions against
other tortfeasors.32 The covenant not to sue, however, raised several
problems regarding interpretation of settlement agreements.33
In 1957, the California Legislature adopted a package of legislative
amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure entitled "Releases From
and Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors." 34 This package was
designed to respond to the problems created by the common law release

rule." The code section pertinant to the Mesler decision was section
877.36 Section 877 provides that when an aggrieved party releases one
or more of several joint tortfeasors, or the parties institute a covenant not to sue, the release or covenant will not discharge any other
tortfeasors from liability to the aggrieved party. 7 Section 877 applies
when the release or covenant not to sue was made in good faith before
a verdict or judgment was rendered.3"
The Mesler court recognized that application of section 877 would
allow the plaintiff to pursue an action against Bragg Management
despite the settlement with Bragg Crane.3 9 Bragg Management claimed

that section 877 should not apply to claims brought under the alter
ego doctrine.4" Bragg Management asserted that since the alter ego
32. Id. (citing Kincheloe v. Retail Credit Co., 4 Cal. 2d 21, 23, 46 P.2d 971 (1935)). The
covenants were not releases but promises not to institute a lawsuit against the covenantee. Id.
33. Id. (citing Pellet v. Sonotone Corp., 26 Cal. 2d 705, 711, 160 P.2d 783, 785-86 (1945)).
The distinction between release agreements and covenants not to sue was entirely artificial.
The primary distinction was that the latter would allow the covenantor to seek indemnity from
other tortfeasors not parties to the agreement. Id.
34. Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 298-99, 702 P.2d at 605, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 447. The package
of amendments included § 875 (providing for contribution among joint judgment debtors);
§ 876 (pro rata share determinations for judgment debtors); § 877 (abrogating the common
law release rule); § 878 (providing the procedure a judgment debtor may follow to obtain contribution from a joint tortfeasor). CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE §§ 875-78. See also § 877.5 (dealing
with sliding scale agreements); § 877.6 (establishing procedures to determine presence of good
faith in settlement agreements in response to American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court,
20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978)). CAL. Civ. PRoC. CODE §§ 877.5, 877.6.
35. Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 298-99, 702 P.2d at 605, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
36. Id. at 229, 702 P.2d at 605, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
37. California Civil Procedure Code § 877 states:
Where a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to sue or
not to enforce a judgment is given in good faith before verdict or judgment to one
or more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same tort -(a)
It shall not discharge any other such tortfeasor from liability unless its terms so provide, but it shall reduce the claims against the others in the amount stipulated by
the release, the dismissal or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration
paid for it whichever is the greater; and (b) It shall discharge the tortfeasor to whom
it is given from all liability for any contribution to any other tortfeasors.
CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 877.

38. CAL. CrV. PRoc. CODE § 877.
39. Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 299, 702 P.2d at 605, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
40. Id.
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doctrine rested upon the theory that the two separate entities of the
parent and the subsidiary corporations were actually one, settlement
with one entity effectively amounted to settlement with the other. 4 '
Furthermore, Bragg Management maintained that section 877 applied
only to joint tortfeasors, not to parent corporations held liable for
acts of subsidiaries through application of the alter ego doctrine.4 2
Bragg Management cited the federal district court decision in Fuls
v. Shastina Properties,Inc.4 3 as controlling case law."' In Fuls plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement with a subsidiary corporation.45 The subsidiary corporation allegedly committed fraud and
violated sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.46 The plaintiff then sued the parent-owner of the subsidiary in an action for
damages.4 7 The Fuls court determined that the standard for piercing
the corporate veil under the alter ego doctrine was that a parent-owner
of a subsidiary corporation would be liable if the degree of unity of
interest aitd ownership was so significant that the individuality of the
subsidiary corporation and the-parent-owner had ceased.4 The Fuls
court held that when the alter ego doctrine was applicable, the two
corporations were treated as one for the purpose of determining liability.49 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the release of one corporation released both because the two corporations are actually one
entity." The Fuls case was later reaffirmed by the Ninth Circuit in
M/V American Queen v. San Diego Marine Construction, Corp.5 '
The Mesler court did not find the Fuls or subsequent cases affirming Fuls to be compelling. 2 The court faulted the Fuls court for failing to consider section 877 of the California Code of Civil Procedure
and for misinterpreting the use of the alter ego doctrine by California courts.53 After dispensing with federal decisions, the Mesler court

41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
448 F. Supp. 983 (N.D. Cal. 9th Cir. 1978).
Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 299, 702 P.2d at 605-06, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 447.

45.

Fuls, 448 F. Supp. at 988.

46. Id. at 986.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 989 (citing Hollywood Cleaners & Pressing Co. v. Hollywood Laundry Service,
Inc., 217 Cal. 124, 129, 17 P.2d 709, 711 (1932) (applying the alter ego doctrine)).
49. Fuls, 448 F. Supp. at 989.
50. Id. See infra notes 119-27 and accompanying text.
51. M/V American Queen v. San Diego Marine Constr. Corp., 708 F.2d 1483 (9th Cir.
1983) (even if a parent corporation was the alter ego of a subsidiary, the parent would be
released from liability through the plaintiff's settlement with the subsidiary); see also infra notes
117-25 and accompanying text.
52. Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 299-300, 702 P.2d at 606, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 448.
53. Id.
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discussed the proper application of the alter ego doctrine in California.5"
The court held that the alter ego doctrine applies when a defendant uses the separate entity of a corporation as a shield to derogate
a plaintiff's rights and interests. 5 In these circumstances, a court may
disregard the separate corporate entity and hold individual shareholders
or owners liable for the acts of the corporation.

6

According to the

court, no rigid test exists to determine when the corporate veil, or
separate entity of the corporation, should be pierced." In California,
however, the common requirements for use of the alter ego doctrine
are: (1) that such unity of interest and ownership exist that the personalities of the corporation and the owners are no longer separate,
and (2) that, if the acts are treated as those of the corporation alone,
an inequitable result will follow.5 8 Once the factors required for piercing the corporate veil have been established, the owners of a corporation may be held personally liable for the acts of the corporation. 9
The Mesler court found that once the criteria required to pierce
the corporate veil were met, the separate corporate entity would be

disregarded for purposes of indemnity against the owners of the corporation. 60 The corporate entity, however, will not be disregarded for
all purposes. 6 ' A separate corporate entity existed for other purposes
such as continuing business activities or determining joint liability.62
The court reasoned that the requirement of avoiding inequitable results
supports the contention that a corporate entity may be pierced for
the purpose of reaching the assets of an alter ego parent corpora-

tion. 63 That same factor also dictates that the corporate entity re54. Id. at 300, 702 P.2d at 606, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 448 (the court did not find Fuls or
M/V American Queen binding); see also infra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
55. Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 300, 702 P.2d at 606, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 448; see also 6 WITKIN,
SUMmARY OF CALIFORN A LAW,

Corporations, § 5, at 4318 (8th ed. 1974).

56. Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 300, 702 P.2d at 606, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 448. The separate entity
of a corporation is a privilege created by statute. Abuse of the privilege will allow a court
to disregard the separate entity and hold the owners of the corporation liable. Id.
57. Id. See also infra notes 98-130 and accompanying text.
58. Id. (citing McLoughlin v. L. Bloom Sons Co., Inc., 206 Cal. App. 2d 848, 851, 24
Cal. Rptr. 311, 313 (1962) (equity was a primary requirement in piercing the corporate veil).
59. Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 300-01, 702 P.2d at 606, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 448.
60. Id. at 300, 702 P.2d at 606, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 448.
61. Id. at 300, 702 P.2d at 606-07, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 447-48; see also 6 WIThIN, SuIAstRY
oF CALnORmIA LAW, Corporations,§ 5, at 4318 (8th ed. 1974); Kohn v. Kohn, 95 Cal. App.
2d 708, 214 P.2d 71 (1950) (in a dissolution proceeding, a husband's alter ego corporation
may be pierced for the purpose of awarding damages to a spouse; yet remain whole for other
purposes).
62. Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 301, 702 P.2d at 607, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 449 (citing McLoughlin
v. L. Bloom Sons Co., Inc., 206 Cal. App. 2d 848, 854, 24 Cal. Rptr. 311, 314 (1962)).
63. Id. at 301, 702 P.2d at 607, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
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main whole for other purposes." The court held this situation
analogous to "a hole being drilled in the wall of limited liability erected
by the corporate form; for all purposes other than that for which
the hole was drilled, the wall still stands." 6 Next, the court stated
that a judgment obtained against a corporation and its alter ego was
enforceable against both separately if section 877 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure was applied to piercing situations. 6 If sec-

tion 877 was not applicable, however, settlement with one6 7tortfeasor

would release both under the common law release rule.
Bragg Management contended that section 877 applied only to joint
tortfeasors and not a corporation held liable through the alter ego
doctrine. 8 The court considered the language of section 877 and determined that the drafters of the section intended it tQ be interpreted
broadly.6 9 Furthermore, the court held that the broad lanquage used

in section 877 included not only70 joint tortfeasors, but also concurrent and successive tortfeasors.
Next, the court considered the application of section 877 to principalagent relationships. 7 The court noted that in Ritter v. Technicolor,
Corp.,7 2 a Califiornia appellate court had applied section 877 to the
principal-agent relationship, finding that a settlement with an agent
does not release a principal from liability." Since the legislature had

not spoken against the decision in Ritter, the Mesler court presumed
legislative acquiescence to the decision.

4

The Mesler court also determined that a vicariously liable principal
should be held liable not on the basis of fault, but because the in-

terests of justice require that the enterprise be held financially respon64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 301-02, 702 P.2d at 607, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
69. Id. at 302, 702 P.2d at 607-08, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 449-50. The drafters of § 877 did
not use restrictive wording in the statute. Instead of the narrow term "joint tortfeasors," the
broad phrase "tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same tort" was used. Id. See also 4
WrrxiN, StulasRaY oF CAxLioRNA LAW, Torts, § 39, at 2338 (8th ed. 1974).
70. Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 302, 702 P.2d at 607-08, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 449-50 (citing City
of Sacramento v. Gemsch Inv. Co., 115 Cal. App. 3d 869, 877, 171 Cal. Rptr. 764, 768-69
(1981) and (broad language of § 877 includes concurrent, successive, joint, or several tortfeasors); Ritter v. Technicolor Corp., 27 Cal. App. 3d 152, 153-54, 103 Cal. Rptr. 686, 687
(1972) (the legislature did not intend for § 877 to be restricted only to "true joint tortfeasors").
71. Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 302, 702 P.2d at 608, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 450.
72. Ritter v. Technicolor, Corp., 27 Cal. App. 3d 152, 103 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1972).
73. Id. at 154, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
74. Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 303, 702 P.2d at 608-09, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 450-51. The California Legislature has not acted contrary to the decision in Ritter. Therefore they must have acquiesced to the application of § 877 to vicariously liable parties. Id. (citing Estate of McDill,
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sible for the risks of conducting business."' The court analogized
principal-agent relationships to alter ego parent and subsidiary corporations and found that the interests of justice supported imposition of liability in both cases.7 6 In addition, the court considered case
law of other states with contribution statutes similar to section 877. 77
The Mesler court then looked at the policies underlying the ap-

plication of section 877 to determine whether the provision should
apply to alter ego corporations.78 The three policies supporting ap-

plication of section 877 to alter ego corporations are: First, maximizing the potential for an injured party to recover fully for injuries
balanced against the fault of other parties; second, encouraging pretrial
settlement of claims; and third, apportioning liability between multiple tortfeasors.7o9 With respect to the first policy, the court felt that

full recovery would not be achieved if a plaintiff's claim against an
alter ego parent were dismissed after plaintiff had settled with a sub-

sidiary."0 Because many alter ego subsidiaries are undercapitalized,
a settling plaintiff may often settle for an amount below the true
value of the claim. 8 ' In addition, since many alter ego parent and
subsidiary corporations are represented by the same counsel, the court
found that alter ego corporations could escape contribution as joint
14 Cal. 3d 831, 839, 537 P.2d 874, 878-79, 122 Cal. Rptr. 754, 758 (1975) (failure of the
legislature to act on a judicial holding is presumed to be legislative acquiescence)).
75. Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 302, 702 P.2d at 608, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 450 (citing Hinman
v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 2 Cal. 3d 956, 959-60, 471 P.2d 988, 990, 88 Cal. Rptr. 188, 190
(1970) (losses caused by an employee are a required cost of an employer in doing business);
and Rogers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 608, 618, 124 Cal. Rptr. 143, 148 (1972)
(vicarious liability justified because an employer is better able to absorb and distribute the loss)).
76. Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 302, 702 P.2d at 608, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 450. The court found
the same "interest of justice" that allows a plaintiff to seek indemnity against a principal after
settlement with an agent should apply to a situation in which a plaintiff has settled with a
subsidiary corporation and seeks additional indemnity from the alter ego parent of the subsidiary. Id. (citing Hinman v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 2 Cal. 3d 956, 971 P.2d 988, 88
Cal. Rptr. 188 (1970); Rogers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 608, 124 Cal. Rptr.
143 (1972)).
77. Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 303-04, 702 P.2d at 608, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 450; see Harris v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 550 F. Supp. 1024, 1030 (,V.D. Va. 1982) (release of an agent does
not preclude suit against a principal); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Sweet, 568 P.2d 916, 929-30
(Alaska 1977); Idaho v. Draper, 505 P.2d 1265, 1268-69 (Idaho 1973) (release of agent does
not release principal); but see Craven v. Lawson, 534 S.W.2d 653, 656 (1976) (release of agent
acts to release principal regardless of joint tortfeasor contribution statute similar to § 877).
78. Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 304, 702 P.2d at 609, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 451.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 304, 702 P.2d at 609, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 451. The intent behind the adoption
of §§ 876 and 877 was to clarify the liability of tortfeasors and to benefit negligently injured
plaintiffs. Without § 877, partial settlement with one defendant could hinder complete recovery.
Id. (citing Mayhugh v. County of Orange, 141 Cal. App. 3d 763, 766-67, 190 Cal. Rptr. 537,
538-39 (1983) (under § 877, a good faith settlement with an employee does not release a jointly
liable employer)).
81. See Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 304, 702 P.2d at 609, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 451.
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tortfeasors by including both corporations in the settlement.8 2 Thus,
the imposition of joint tortfeasor status would give parent corporations greater incentive to participate in settlement agreements.1 3 Finally,
the court focused on the third policy of apportioning liability between
multiple tortfeasors.84 The court was concerned that an unsuspecting
plaintiff may settle for a small sum from an undercapitalized subsidiary and be barred from full recovery against an alter ego parent."'
The court stated that a parent corporation should not receive a special
benefit from a settlement intended by a subsidiary and an injured
party to be binding only between the injured party and the subsidiary. 6
The application of these policies confirmed the holding of the court
that, in a tort action, the release of an alter ego subsidiary corporation does not release the alter ego parent corporation. 7 Hence, the
summary judgment in favor of Bragg Management was reversed. 8
C.

The Dissent

The dissenting justices, Lucas and Grodin, disagreed with the reasoning of the majority. 9 The dissent initially was concerned with the
reliance by the majority on principal-agent relationships," stating that
the individual identities attributed to a principal and an agent are
not present in an action piercing the corporate veil of an alter ego
parent corporation.9" According to the dissent, once a parent-owner
and a subsidiary corporation are shown to be in an alter ego relationship, the two corporations are no longer individuals but are treated
as one entity. 92 Secondly, the dissent addressed the policy concern
raised by the majority that a plaintiff might settle with an undercapitalized subsidiary and be barred from further recovery from an
alter ego parent. 93 The dissent felt that this situation could be remedied
by express reservation by plaintiffs of the right to seek recovery against
other defendants. 94 Finally, the dissent considered the application by
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 305, 702 P.2d at 609-10, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 451-52.
Id.
Id. at 305-06, 702 P.2d at 609-10, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 451-52.
Id. at 305-06, 702 P.2d at 610, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 452.

86.

Id.

87. Id. at 306, 702 P.2d at 610, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 452.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 306, 702 P.2d at 610, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 452.
90. Id. at 306, 702 P.2d at 610-11, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 452-53.
91. Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 307, 702 P.2d at 607, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 453.
92. Id. at 307-09, 702 P.2d at 611-12, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 453-54; see I FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
CoRPoRATIoNs, § 41.10, at 397-98 (perm. ed. 1983) (when a corporation is the alter ego of
another corporation, the separate entity ends and the two are treated as one).
93. Mesler, at 309-10, 702 P.2d 612-13, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 454-55.
94. Id.
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the majority of California Code of Civil Procedure section 877, 9

reasoning that alter ego corporations are not joint tortfeasors but are
merely the aliases of a single tortfeasor. 96 Hence, the dissent stated
that section 877 should not apply to situations like Mesler because

an alter ego parent and subsidiary are one entity and not joint tortfeasors.9 7
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

California regards corporations as legal entities separate from their
owners.9 8 In the event of injury to a third party, recovery against
a corporation usually is limited to the assets of the corporation.9 9
Limited liability protects the owners of a corporation from personal
liability.'0 0 Because the limited liability sometimes is subject to abuse,

courts have fashioned an equitable doctrine commonly referred to as
"piercing the corporate veil."''

Piercing the corporate veil allows

an injured party to look behind the "veil" of limited corporate liability
and seek indemnity from the owners of the corporation. 0 2 When a
subsidiary corporation is owned by a parent corporation, an injured
party may pierce the corporate veil of the subsidiary to reach the
assets of the parent corporation. 0 3 The primary method for piercing
the veil of a parent-owned subsidiary is the alter ego doctrine.104
The alter ego doctrine provides that if the unity of interest between
a corporation and its owners is so close that the owners and the cor-

95. Id. at 311, 702 P.2d at 613, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 455.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Merco Constr. Engineers v. Municipal Court, 21 Cal. 3d 724, 729-30, 581 P.2d
636, 639, 147 Cal. Rptr. 631, 634 (1978) (corporation is distinct from thie shareholders); Cooperman v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 49 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7, 122 Cal. Rptr.
127, 131 (1975) (a corporation is a separate and distinct entity from its owners).
99. See generally Merco Constr., 21 Cal. 3d 724, 729-30, 581 P.2d 636, 639, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 631, 634 (1978) (recovery against a corporation is limited to corporate assets only); Cooperman v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 49 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7, 122 Cal. Rptr.
127, 131 (1985).
100. See Metro Constr., 21 Cal. 3d 724, 729-30, 581 P.2d 636, 639, 147 Cal. Rptr. 631,
634 (1978).
101. Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 301, 702 P.2d at 607, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
102. See Seymour v. Hull & Moreland Eng'g, 605 F.2d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir. 1979) (piercing
allows a plaintiff access to the assets of corporate shareholders); Plumbers and Fitters Local
761 v. Matt J. Zaich Constr. Co., 418 F.2d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 1969) (no limited liability
for shareholders once corporate veil is pierced).
103. See Edwin K. Williams & Co., Inc. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co.-East, 542 F.2d 1053,
1063-64 (9th Cir. 1976) (parent corporation subject to liability for the wrongdoings of its alter
ego subsidiary).
104. Id.
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poration are not separate, the two will be considered alter egos of

each other.' 0° Factors usually considered in piercing under the alter
ego doctrine include compliance with corporate formalities,' 0

6

ade-

07

quate initial capitalization of the corporation,
proper use of corporate funds,'0 8 and finally, whether allowing the corporate entity to
stand would perpetuate fraud or injustice. 10 9
California courts consider these factors but usually state the test
for alter ego piercing in a simple two-step form. In an action to pierce
the corporate veil through the alter ego doctrine, the complaining party
must show a unity of interest and ownership between the owner and
the corporation. This unity must be so substantial that the separate
identities of the corporation and the owners no longer exist and failure
to pierce the corporate veil would lead to an inequitable result." 0 The
alter ego doctrine of piercing was designed to prevent owners of corporations from harming third parties and taking advantage of the
limited liability afforded corporations."' The policy of protecting innocent third parties from the wrongful acts of corporate owners
through piercing the corporate veil is undisputed by most courts." 2
The result of a successful piercing action against an alter ego parent
corporation and subsidiary, however, is the basis for a great deal of
controversy."13
105. See FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 41.10, at 397-98 (1983 perm. ed.) (unity of ownership and interest show that the separate personalities of the corporation and the
individual no longer exist).
106. See Von Brimer v. Whirlpool Corp., 362 F. Supp. 1182, 1194 (9th Cir. 1973) (corporate formalities a factor in alter ego piercing); Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 579-80,
364 P.2d 473, 475, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641, 643 (1961) (commingling of assets and withdrawal of
funds by the equitable owners may be factors in-allowing the disregard of the corporate entity).
107. See Automotriz De California v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792, 796-97, 306 P.2d 1, 4 (1957)
(initial inadequate capitalization of a corporation may be grounds to pierce the corporate veil);
see also 6 WrrriN, SUMMARY OF CALFORNIA LAW, Corporations, § 5, at 4322 (8th ed. 1974)
(corporations must be organized with sufficient capitalization); Note, Liability of a Corporation for Acts of Subsidiary or Affiliate, 71 HARv. L. REV. 1122, 1125 (1958); Hamilton, The
CorporateEntity, 49 TEx. L. REv. 979, 985 (1971) (adequate financal status at the outset of
the corporate existence is essential to avoid disregard of the corporate entity).
108. See Horticultural Enterprises Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 477 F. Supp. 161, 161 (9th
Cir. 1979) (intermingling of corporate and personal funds grounds to disregard corporate entity); Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 579, 364 P.2d 473, 475, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641, 643 (1961)
(withdrawal of corporate assets for personal use is improper).
109. See American Home Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 122 Cal. App. 3d 951, 966-67,
175 Cal. Rptr. 826, 834 (1981) (fraud or inequity remedied by allowing alter ego claims).
110. See Fuls, 448 F. Supp. at 989; Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 300, 702 P.2d at 606, 216 Cal.
Rptr. at 448.
111. See, e.g., Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 300, 702 P.2d at 606, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 448.
112. See id.
113. Compare Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 305-06, 702 P.2d at 610, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 452 (release
of a subsidiary corporation does not release alter ego parent corporation) with Fuls, 448 F.
Supp. at 989 (release of subsidiary corporation releases alter ego parent corporation).
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Prior to the Mesler decision, a successful piercing action against
an alter ego parent of a subsidiary would result in the parent and
subsidiary being treated as one entity. 1 4 This result is referred to as
the common entity rule."' Prior to Mesler, the common entity rule
would not have allowed a plaintiff who settled with a subsidiary to
bring an action against the alter ego parent of the subsidiary."16
In 1983, the Ninth Circuit decided a case which involved a plaintiff's settlement with a subsidiary corporation owned by an alter ego
parent corporation." 7 M/V American Queen v. San Diego Marine
Construction Co. involved a factual situation very similar to Mesler."8
In M/V American Queen, the plaintiff brought an action against a
ship repair company, San Diego Marine Construction, and its parent
company, Campbell Industries, for negligent repairs to the plaintiff's
ship."19 Plaintiff had signed an agreement with San Diego Marine promising to give notice within a certain time period if suit was to be
filed againsi San Diego Marine. 2 The plaintiff brought an action
after the notice period had elapsed.' 2 ' At trial, the court decided that
the agreement between the plaintiff and San Diego Marine was a valid
22
release agreement and released San Diego Marine from all liability.'
The court then considered the issue of whether the plaintiff could
plead the alter ego doctrine for purposes of getting damages from
Campbell Industries.' 23 The court stated that consideration of the applicability of the alter ego doctrine was necessary because the release
agreement with San Diego Marine would preclude the plaintiff from
taking action against Campbell even if Campbell was the alter ego
of San Diego Marine."' The court expressly reaffirmed the Fuls holding
V

114. See, e.g., M/V American Queen v. San Diego Marine Constr., 708 F.2d 1483, 1490
(9th Cir. 1983) (parent-owner and subsidiary considered as one entity when alter ego doctrine
successfully pleaded); see also 1 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 41.10, at 397-98
(1983 perm. ed.) (when a corporation is the alter ego of another corporation, the distinct cor-

porate entity is disregarded and the two corporations treated as one); 6 WIKIN, SuratY
OF CALIFoRNIA LAW, Corporations, § 11, at 4323 (8th ed. 1974).
115. See BLUMBERO, THE LAW OF CORPORA GRoups, ProceduralProblems in the Law
of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations,§ 1.02.1, at 9 (1982) (courts will usually construct a

common identity for the parent and subsidiary corporations, treating them as one).
116.

See, e.g., M/V American Queen v. San Diego Marine Constr., 708 F.2d 1483, 1490

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

M/V American Queen, 708 F.2d at 1483-84.
Id. at 1486-87.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1487.
Id.
Id. at 1489-90.
Id. at 1490.

(settlement with subsidiary releases alter ego parent corporation).
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that an alter ego parent and a subsidiary are to be treated as one
entity once the corporate veil is pierced.' 2 5
The federal cases were distinquished by the Mesler court.' 2 6 The
common entity rule, which prior to Mesler would have considered
a subsidiary corporation and an alter ego parent as one entity, has
been drastically affected by the Mesler holding.' 27 After Mesler, alter
ego parent and subsidiary corporations may be considered one entity
for the purpose of allowing a plaintiff access to the assets of the
parent corporation.' 28 The parent and subsidiary, however, will be
treated as joint tortfeasors for the purpose of contributing to any
judgment awarded to the plaintiff. 2 9 The reasoning of the Mesler
court will allow piercing of the corporate veil for a specific purpose
without disrupting the separate corporate entities of a parent and subsidiary corporation for other purposes. 3 '
III.

LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS

The Mesler decision will have a substantial effect upon the relationship between parent and subsidiary corporations.'' Mesler has
effectively overruled the common entity theory in California.' If a
plaintiff can pierce an alter ego parent corporation successfully, the
parent and subsidiary will be treated as joint tortfeasors, making both
jointly and severally liable under section 877 of the California Code
of Civil Procedure.' 3 3 This exposure to potential liability will force
parent corporations to either participate in negotiations between injured parties and subsidiaries or to avoid potential piercing by strictly conforming with corporate guidelines.' 34 By overruling a longstanding doctrine that subsidiary and alter ego parent corporations are to
be treated as one for purposes of liability, the Mesler court may erode
125. Id.
126. Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 299-301, 702 P.2d at 605-08, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 447-50; see supra
notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Compare Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 305-06, 702 P.2d at 610, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 452 (release
of subsidiary corporation does not release an alter ego parent corporation) with Fuls, 448 F.
Supp. at 989 (release of a subsidiary corporation also releases alter ego parent corporation).
130. Mesler, at 300-01, 702 P.2d at 606-07, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 448-49; see also supra notes
78-87 and accompanying text.
131. See Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 309-10, 702 P.2d at 613, 216 Cal. Rptr. 455 (Lucus, J.,
dissenting).
132. See id. at 310, 702 P.2d at 612, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 454 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
133. See generally Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d 290, 702 P.2d 601, 216 Cal. Rptr. 443.
134. See Mesler, at 309-10, 702 P.2d at 612-13, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 454-55 (Lucas, J.,
dissenting).
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the concept of limited liability enjoyed by owners of corporations.'"
CONCLUSION

During November, 1985, a California appellate court in Pacific
Union Conference of Seventh Day Adventists v. Brasher held that
section 877 of the California Code of Civil Procedure did not apply
to principal-agent relationships.'1 6 The Pacific Union court held that
the common law release rule would apply when an injured party settled
and released an employee.' 37 Therefore, the release of an employee
would also release an employer.' 38 Because Pacific Union was ordered
not published, it remains to be seen whether future courts will follow
the California Suprme Court's holding in Mesler or swing towards
the holding in Pacific Union.
Robert T. Haney

135. See id. at 310, 702 P.2d at 613, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 455 (potential erosion of the limited
liability of corporations).
136. Pacific Union Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Brasher, 219 Cal. Rptr. 260,
266-67 (1985) (ordered not published).
137. Id. at 266-67 (section 877 does not abrogate the common law rule that the release
of an employee releases the employer).
138. Id.

